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Literature between Medicine and Religion: Herder’s aesthetics of touch and the 
emerging field of Medical Humanities
*
Abstract: This article uses a reading of Herder‟s early essay Sculpture to locate 
Herder‟s place within the complex genealogies of thought regarding the mind-body 
problem. It analyses how Herder discusses sculpture and touch by combining an 
idealist with a materialist position. Herder theorizes sculpture in order to close the gap 
between mind and body as well as that between art and life. According to Danto, this 
non-dualist approach shapes much of the contemporary art scene.   
1  Herder’s intellectual journey from medicine to theology and philosophy  
This article discusses the pertinence of of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) 
thought about art and religion for the conception of the emerging field of Medical 
Humanities. Medical Humanities is a discipline that is quite akin to Herder‟s 
interdisciplinary work in anthropology, medicine/health, theology, literary-and art 
criticism (see Evans and Macnaughton). As will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs, his work on sculpture, history, poetry and prose is intricately related to his 
theological thought. Part of the appeal of Herder‟s writing is that his theology is non-
dogmatic and almost invisible: it is obscure, relying on the limited and dark sense of 
touch rather than on the all-compassing visions yielded by sight. Instead of touting 
creeds and other fideistic statement, Herder‟s theology almost unnoticeably emerges 
from his discussion of mundane and secular topics. His work on sculpture is thus 
informed by what one could call a “non-assertive theology” (as differentiated from 
dogmatic theology). In other words, it might be worth speaking of a “theological 
sensibility” rather than a systematic theology in the writing and thought of this 
Enlightenment, art and literary critic, poet, philologist, anthropologist, historian, 
philosopher and theologian.  
By rejecting dogma and creed Herder offended the theological and also 
philosophical, medical-scientific orthodoxies of his time. In order to introduce this 
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exciting eighteenth century thinker to the reader, the following section will trace the 
young Herder‟s intellectual itinerary from medicine to theology and philosophy.  
Herder was unorthodox because he denied the divine authorship of the Bible, 
believed that revelation was not a prerequisite of the Christian faith but was rather 
scattered throughout all religions. He moreover did not propound a systematic 
theology which advanced a Christology or offered a dogmatic conception of sin. As  
Clark has succinctly put it, “the simple truth is that Herder‟s religion at this time [i.e. 
ca. 1764] lacked two important doctrines common to most Christian creeds: (1) a 
systematic doctrine of the nature of sin, and (2) the doctrine of the vicarious sacrifice 
of Jesus Christ” (Clark, p. 211). Clark goes on to make clear that this state of affairs is 
by no means restricted to the year 1764: “although Herder was at no time an atheist or 
agnostic, he was likewise at no time after 1764 a believer in the majority of the 
doctrines of his church or any other” (Clark, p. 211). This unorthodoxy would 
certainly have found strong support in the Socinianism which informs Spinoza‟s 
writings on Jesus‟ political and social impact rather than on the doctrinal core of 
Christian instruction—be that original sin or redemption through crucifixion (see 
Clark, p. 211).  Like Spinoza, Herder focuses on Jesus‟ humanity, on his justitia and 
on his caritas.
i
  
Indeed when Herder gave Goethe a copy of Spinoza‟s Ethics he draws a 
parallel between Spinoza‟s and Jesus‟s respective teaching (see Bell, p. 98). Herder‟s 
theological work was scandalous, because it was radically non-dogmatic. The 
theologian Friedrich Wilhelm Kantzenbach has rightly emphasized Herder‟s 
heterodoxy. According to Kantzenbach Herder promotes the personal religion of 
Jesus which is quite different from the organized religion of Jesus Christ the redeemer 
(Kantzenbach, p. 104).   
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This is not to deny that Herder was a theologian and part of the Lutheran 
clergy. His understanding of humanity and its history diverges, however, from 
Christian dogmatic teaching. In order to better understand Herder‟s theological 
position, it worth referring to David Jasper‟s distinction between Christendom and the 
heterodox or radical theology of the early Christianity of the desert fathers: “Only 
with the radical dissolution of Christendom and its aftermath in the West can the 
radical theology that has always been the theology of the desert begin to be articulated 
again in a language whose end is always silent” (Jasper, p. 162). Herder‟s theology 
finds its end in being silent and this nowhere more so than in his work as literary and 
art critic. The silent or non-assertive presence of religion within Herder‟s writing on 
art and literature is part of its potential appeal to contemporary theologians like Jasper 
who are sensitive to the presence of religion in what is apparently non-religious.  
This article analyzes how Spinoza‟s medical conception of the mind as the 
idea of the body informs Herder‟s silent theology of embodied works of art (like 
sculpture). Spinoza is important because he relates the cerebral or spiritual (the mind) 
to the corporeal. Spinoza‟s view establishes an isomorphism between the two entities 
while at the same time not questioning their distinct identities. As the idea of the 
body, the mind is responsible for actions performed within the external and material 
world of embodiment. The mind does, however, also depend on the medicine-based 
well being of the body. According to Spinoza there is therefore not a hierarchical 
relation in which one commands the other. Rather the mind has to take care of the 
body and the body has to take care of the mind in order to ensure the preservation of 
the self (conatus). Spinoza did not only align the life of the mind with that of the 
body. He also established an invariable link between the equilibrium of the individual 
and that of the society to which he or she belongs. As Genevieve Lloyd has put it: 
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“The mind is the idea of a body which is what it is, and does what it does, by virtue of 
being part of wider wholes reaching up to the totality of the material world” (Lloyd, p. 
96). The connection between the biological and the epistemological on the individual 
scale thus prepares the ground for the larger sphere of inter-subjective relations that 
connect the preservation of the self to the survival of the other. 
In a highly idiosyncratic way Herder revised and, to an orthodox reader 
undermined, modern Christian thought along Spinozist lines. This non-dogmatic 
approach also informs the relationship between philosophy, medicine and theology in 
Herder‟s thought. As Clark has pointed out, Herder‟s theology is quite liberal 
compared to Kant‟s theological focus on original sin and the old Adam: “Herder, the 
protestant theologian and church official, defends in his Ideas the idea that man is 
fundamentally good, spoiled only by over-refinement and specialization (which is a 
function of reason), while Kant, the liberal philosopher, defends the Protestant, 
Christian, orthodox view that man because of his lower impulses, is fundamentally 
evil and has to be saved by an outside agency from the misdirection of his 
powers”(Clark, p. 320).May there be a connection between Herder‟s non-dogmatic 
theology and his critique of his former mentor, the idealist Kant? In his important 
book Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology John H. Zammito has shown how 
Herder was in many ways much more open-minded than the critical Kant. Could 
Herder‟s Spinozism have caused his intellectual clash with Kant? David Bell, for one, 
has argued that Herder‟s critique of Kant derives from his Spinozism: “Herder‟s sense 
of divine immanence and his naturalistic monism are diametrically opposed to Kant‟s 
rigid dualism” (Bell, p. 143).   Herder conceives of God and the world along Spinozist 
lines and in doing so he delineates the outlines of what I will later call an immanent 
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alterity. Here we find the extraordinary in the ordinary (as in the embodied 
appreciation of our surroundings via sculpture).  
This Spinozist approach, however, was certain to offend Christian orthodoxy. 
Why did Herder risk causing offense? He was after all trained as a theologian and was 
thus aware of the scandalous nature of his theological arguments. So why did Herder 
consciously and conscientiously offend the religious establishment of his time? This 
question brings us to the reasons that motivated him to study theology in the first 
place. In contrast to other eighteenth century German thinkers with a protestant 
background —Friedrich Hölderlin is a famous example of an adolescent intellectual 
who was obliged to study theology with a view of earning a living as a pastor, (which 
he finally refused to become)— theological studies were not forced upon the young 
Herder.  
In fact Herder began his University studies by reading medicine. It was his 
discomfort with his medical training that opened up his interest in theology. What 
precisely made Herder turn away from his initial scholarly pursuit? Medicine has a 
strong practical component and it might well have been this balance between practice 
and theory that attracted Herder in the first place. What alienated him from the desired 
practical pursuits of a medical doctor was the confrontation with death. In 1762, 
during the dissection undertaken by a Russian field doctor at the University of 
Königsberg, Herder passed out in horror. As Simon Richter has put it:  
 
The sight of the dissected body was a painful Reiz for Herder; spontaneous 
contraction (Zurückziehung) occurred in the form of passing out. He became all body 
as his consciousness fled. Returning to consciousness, his repulsion for the body 
decided him once and for all for the study of theology and philosophy. Days later he 
began attending the lectures and seminars of Immanuel Kant (Richter, p. 106). 
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The dissection of the body lays bare its veiled but inherent decomposition. Becoming 
body uncannily instantiates a near death experience: the loss of consciousness seems 
to introduce the reign of corporeal life, which turns out to be death. On this view, 
Herder appears to subscribe to Descartes‟ mind-body divide. Rather than being the 
idea of the body, the mind escapes from the body‟s material entrapment in disease and 
decay: “What Herder is afraid of is the unavoidable presence of death in the material 
body. Once again confronted with the body, Herder passes out, and parts company 
altogether from the body, even as his own body slumps to the ground” (Richter, p. 
127). Richter thus offers an intriguing account of Herder‟s confrontation with the 
medical body.  
This is, however, only one part of his educational itinerary. True, confronted 
with the decayed body, as so forcefully presented in the dissection theatre, Herder 
abandoned his medical training and took up the study of theology and philosophy 
under Kant‟s generous mentorship. What attracted him immensely to the pre-critical 
Kant was independence of thought as well as the all-inclusive quest for truth. Even 
after having taken issue with Kantian transcendental philosophy, the mature Herder of 
the Letters toward the Advancement of Humanity praised Kant as an inspiring teacher: 
“no intrigue, no sect, no advantage, no nomenclatural ambition (Namen-Ehrgeiz) ever 
held out for him the least attraction (Reiz) compared to the expansion and 
enlightenment of truth. He encouraged and pleasantly extorted independent thinking 
(Selbstdenken); despotism was not part of his personality (Gemüt)” (Herder, 1991, p. 
424). When Herder took issue with what he perceived to be the dogmatism of Kant‟s 
transcendental philosophy, he might well have believed himself to act according to 
the teachings of his former mentor. His critique of the post-1769 Kant thus enacted 
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the instructions of the pre-1769 Kant: namely, independent thinking and the non-
exclusive quest for enlightenment.  
Yet this enthusiastic search for truth opens up an abyss of lifelessness which in 
a perturbing way resembles Herder‟s traumatic experience in the dissection theatre.  
In 1764 Herder finished his theological and philosophical studies in Königsberg and 
left for the Baltic city Riga where he worked as a writer, priest and teacher. From this 
far off and rather marginal place Herder established himself as an outstanding German 
literary critic. Herder, the son of a lower class family, became a prominent public 
figure by dint of his work as a writer. Neither his lowly origins nor the marginality of 
the place in which he wrote dampens the appeal of his literary output. Here he is 
clearly the pupil of Kant: diffidence about his economic and class background does 
not deter him from gaining recognition of his intellectual achievements.  
Why does Herder nevertheless feel uncomfortable as a writer? He enters a 
space that seems to be free of domination. Jürgen Habermas has famously called this 
space the “public sphere”. Here different arguments compete for prominence on 
purely rational grounds, regardless of the social and economic status of its 
participants: “The „domination‟ of the public, according to its own idea, was an order 
in which domination itself was dissolved; veritas non auctoritas facit legem” 
(Habermas, p. 82). On this view, the emerging eighteenth century public sphere 
subjects domination to the powers of reason. This explains why Herder could achieve 
public prominence through his Fragments about New German Literature. It does, 
however, not account for the widespread appeal of his work as a literary critic.  
The fact that Herder developed his popular philosophy as a critic of art and 
literature seems to substantiate Habermas‟ thesis according to which the public sphere 
originates in the literary world and then expands into a wider political realm. A 
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Cartesian mind-body divide underlines, however, Habermas‟ evolutionary 
understanding of rationality. Jonathan M. Hess has recently questioned this opposition 
between the literary-representational body politic (which belongs to the age of 
absolutism) and the purely rational discourse of the fully developed bourgeois public 
sphere. Hess counters Habermas‟ argumentation by pointing out that the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century absolutism of the French and German monarchies “claimed its 
own form of political rationality” and that therefore the Habermasean separation 
between the rational, on the one hand, and, the body politic, on the other, was not 
historically water tight (Hess, p. 145).   
Hess‟ critique of Habermas‟ understanding of the eighteenth century public 
sphere helps explain Herder‟s ambiguous attitude toward literature and art as self-
enclosed entities set apart from embodiment—Herder is of course drawn to sculpture 
because it is a presentation rather than merely representation of the body. Due to his 
fascination with presentation, Herder was concerned that the world of letters, in 
particular, and of representation, in general, falls prey to paralysis. He feared that the 
world of letters would deaden rather than enliven its participants. In order to avoid the 
potentially paralyzing effect of artistic production and consumption Herder attempted 
to link the work of intellectual inquiry to the sphere of medicine and the body. In his 
work as art critic he attempted to connect the apparently irrational realm of the 
corporeal with the workings of the mind.  
2. Touch or the outdoing of dualisms 
In Scupture, in particular, Herder develops an aesthetics that differentiates 
itself from high levels of ideation.  In some strands within the idealist tradition a gulf 
opens which separates both the body from the mind and ordinary inclinations from the 
sublime sphere of duty and reason (see Mack 2003). By abolishing these hierarchical 
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divides Herder‟s aesthetics is close to Arthur C. Danto‟s contemporary philosophy of 
art. From a historical perspective one could establish the link between Herder and 
Danto via Hegel. Herder was a major influence on Hegel. Danto‟s aesthetics, in turn, 
owes much to Hegel. Here I am not, however, concerned with historical itineraries 
but, instead, want to focus on the ways in which Herder shares with Danto‟s aesthetics 
the endeavor to “overcome two boundaries—the boundary between high art and 
popular art, on the one hand; and the boundary between objects that were works of art 
and ordinary objects that were parts of daily culture but had not, until then, ordinarily 
been thought in terms of art” (Danto, 2005, p. x). This is not to say that Herder is a 
pop art theorist. He of course contemplates not the installations of twentieth century 
artists but classical Greek sculpture. He approaches, however, classical Greek 
sculpture in a popular, non-high art way. Here sculpture is not the subject of art 
criticism but an opening toward a novel and more holistic understanding of human 
embodiment. His view of humanity is decisively egalitarian: he does not distinguish 
between artists and ordinary people; nor does he erect boundaries between children 
and grown ups: indeed as we will see soon, one of the starting points for his argument 
about touch and sculpture is the very ordinary setting of a nursery.  
Clearly Herder theorizes sculpture via the common sense of touch and the 
common organ of the hand in order to close the gap between mind and body as well 
as that between art and life. As Danto has pointed out this non-dualistic approach 
shapes much of the contemporary art scene. Referring to Robert Rauschenberg‟s 
famous 1961 expression that the gap between art and life was to be overcome, Danto 
writes: “ „Overcoming the gap between art and life‟ had at once the ring of a 
metaphysical battle cry—like closing the gap between body and mind—and a political 
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slogan promising to abolish privilege.” (Danto, 2005, p. x. ) Herder was indeed one of 
the most radical of early democrats.
ii
  
 Sculpture seems to be a democratic art form: not only is it frequently 
dedicated to public places but it also tends to display what we all have in common: the 
body. Both Danto and Herder focus on embodiment and this appreciation of an 
embodied from of art leads them to an appraisal of sculpture as the most intriguing 
artistic genre. In this context it is important to point out that neither Herder nor Danto 
are materialists, at least not in a narrow sense in which Hobbes or Descartes could be 
labeled materialists. Herder certainly does not espouse a reduction of every form of 
life to material mechanisms (as found in Descartes‟ mechanistic understanding of the 
body). On the contrary Herder allows for an idealism of sorts, one that is, like his 
philosophy and theology, non-assertive insofar as it does not privilege dogma, 
absolute truth, or spiritual existence over and above the fluidity and contingency of 
everyday, embodied life. Herder is to some extent an idealist because he is fascinated 
by the transformative power of ideas but the transformation in question here is not 
superimposed on the material sphere but rather emerges out of it. In the same way 
Herder‟s theological sensibility is not opposed to the secular but rather grows out of 
an engagement with the mundane. Like Danto‟s aesthetics, Herder‟s aesthetics is 
concerned with both content/meaning and its embodiment. “An artwork must have 
content, that is, it must possess aboutness; and it must embody that content,” (Danto, 
2001, p. 8) and it is this fusion of content and embodiment that Herder has in mind 
when he pleads for combining sight (focused on aboutness) and touch (focused on the 
body).  
Most importantly, Herder erases the difference between the aesthetic and the 
ordinary, when he writes that each child learns by precisely fusing touching with 
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seeing. On the first few pages of Sculpture‟s second section, Herder combines his 
interpretation of art with the advice to his readers to go into an everyday nursery: 
 
Go into a nursery and see how the young child who is constantly gathering experience  
reaches out, grasping, lifting, weighing, touching, and measuring things with both 
hand and foot, thereby acquiring securely and confidently the most difficult but also 
the most primary and necessary concepts, such as body, shape, size, space, and 
distance. These concepts cannot be acquired by teaching or explanation, but only 
through experience, through exploring and trying things out for oneself. In a few 
moments the child learns more, and learns it more vividly, more truly and more 
powerfully, then ten thousand years of mere gaping and verbal explanations could 
provide. By continually combining his sense of sight with his sense of touch, allowing 
each to test, extend, enhance, and strengthen the other, he forms his first judgments 
(Herder, 2002, p.37).   
  
The intellectual task of forming a judgment does not begin in the lofty settings of 
museums, lecture theatres or laboratories. Instead it originates in a basic nursery. 
Significantly the nursery has strong associations with nourishment and primary care. 
As such it is related to the corporeal sphere. Herder in fact focuses on the body in his 
discussion of sculpture. He celebrates sculpture as the most embodied art form. Art 
that is closest to Descartes‟ notion of extension (as opposed to Descartes‟ notion of 
thought) requires the most embodied aesthetic reception: that of touch.  
We may perhaps better grasp Herder‟s theory of touch via Jean-Luc Nancy‟s 
recent discussion of body and thought. At first glance the notion „theory‟ does not 
seem to be appropriate in this context, because Herder‟s thought is seemingly non-
theoretical:  he appears to distance himself from detached forms of contemplation and 
observation. Like Nancy, Herder attempts to immerse writing and thinking into what 
is embodied: “Writing is thinking addressed, thinking sent to the body, sent, that is, to 
the thing that displaces, estranges it” (Nancy, p. 19). Herder‟s idiosyncratic form of 
theory or writing retrieves, however, the ancient Greek term thigein for touching. 
Apropos Gilles Deleuzes‟s conception of contemplation without knowledge, Giorigio 
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Agamben has argued that “this contemplation without knowledge” at times recalls 
“the Greek conception of theory as not knowledge but touching (thigein)” (Agamben, 
p. 233-234). Touch sends thought back to the body. This fusion of the thoughtful with 
what is embodied enables what I call an immanent alterity. My notion of immanent 
alterity is based on David Jasper‟s theological understanding of a coincidentia 
oppositorum between the immanent and the transcendent, where both are independent 
while at same time forming a relationship of interdependence. As Jasper has put it: “It 
is a perfect coincidence of opposites—the transcendent utterly immanent, and the 
immanent perfectly transcendent” (Jasper, p. 148).  This theological interaction 
between the immanent and the transcendent informs Herder‟s aesthetics. The 
isomorphism of thought and touch characterizes Herder‟s non-dogmatic approach 
towards both philosophy and theology. Thought as touch and touch as thought 
discovers the extraordinary at the heart of our ordinary immanent existence. This 
fusion of the thoughtful with the embodied is neither radically materialist nor 
radically idealist. Rather it resides within the gap dividing these two extremes and 
keeps crisscrossing their respective boundaries.  
Agamben has called “absolute immanence” the tradition of which Deleuze‟s 
philosophy partakes. Agamben distinguishes between the philosophical trajectory of 
immanence, which starts with Spinoza and then finds its culmination via Nietzsche in 
Deleuze and Foucault, and that of transcendence which encompasses Kant, Husserl, 
Levinas, Derrida. I would argue that Herder‟s thought may be a beginning of a third 
philosophical tradition that touches upon the transcendent within the immanent 
without confusing or conflating one with the other. This tradition may well include 
Heidegger whom Agamben situates as the only exception to the rule between the two 
opposed camps of either transcendence or immanence. As has been intimated above, 
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Herder‟s philosophy of touch and immanent alterity could be read as a creative re-
conception of Spinoza‟s ethical thought.  
Coming back to Herder choosing not an art collection but a nursery as the 
starting point for his discussion of sculpture, it is significant that Spinoza‟s central 
notion of the conatus (self-preservation) has strong nursery-like or nutritive aspects. 
As Spinoza makes clear in his Ethics that the conatus (i.e. self-preservation) depends 
on “those things” which “are most useful to us” and “which can feed and maintain” us 
(Spinoza, p. 159).  Thought that begins with the nursery and the nutritive enmeshes 
the ontological within the ethical; rather than opposing one with the other. Agamben 
has argued that “the most essential character of nutritive life is not simply growth but 
above all self-preservation;” and Agamben goes on to distinguish this Spinozist 
theory, which “brings the paradigm of the soul back to the lower scheme of nutritive 
life,” from “the medico-philosophical”, which “seeks carefully to distinguish the 
various faculties of the soul and to regulate human life according to the high canon of 
the life of the mind.” (Agamben, p. 236). According to Herder we need to return to 
the nursery in order to retrieve a modern sense of classical sculpture. We need to 
grasp how we have come to able to reflect upon ourselves and our habitat.  
The artistic genre for such education is sculpture, because it is through 
sculpture that we come to perceive the world in an engaged manner (in a manner that 
is touching, as it were). Here sight and touch are truly combined. Herder clearly 
believes that classical sculpture is the „nursery‟ of humanity. Herder does not, 
however, plead for a return to antiquity. According to Herder, the Greeks privileged 
the sense of touch, whereas moderns privilege sight. Herder argues for a „modernist‟ 
combination of the two senses which would bring about true Enlightenment. Greek 
sculpture seems to be a nursery that is too one-sided, too much focused on touch: 
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touch, also requires modern sight. The Greek past is incomplete and so is the modern 
exclusion of the classical sense of touch. The following will discuss how Herder‟s 
historicism is part and parcel of his plea for a combination of both two seemingly 
opposed senses and two apparently self-exclusive epochs (that of Greek sculpture and 
that of modern philosophical sight) 
3. The question of classicism and the importance of history 
Herder‟s historical consciousness makes him avoid a naïve belief in a possible 
retrieval of a classical past. He advocates not venerating the past but learning from its 
mistakes. Crucially, historiography compensates for humanity‟s instinctual 
shortcomings. The empirical data that the study of history provides bear an intriguing 
resemblance to the sensual complexities which are the subject matter of medical 
inquiry. Herder‟s philosophy of the factual does not, however, turn positivistic. The 
assembly of historical documents is not enough. Rather humanity has to learn from its 
mistakes in both the present and the past. What the animal does via sensual instinct, 
the human needs to perform via the reflective activity of cultural critique. Yet 
reflection does not operate in an ethereal realm. Rather its work relies on empirical 
data: on sculpture; sight and touch. This is why Herder calls reflection Besonnenheit.  
The term Besonnenheit describes the mind‟s dependence on the senses. Herder 
deliberately uses this term, because it combines the bodily with the rational and the 
sensuous with the intellectual. When we encounter sculptures we are besonnen, 
because we combine the embodied (touch) with the rational (sight). Sight is the quick, 
detached, rational sense and touch is the more obscure, slow, incomplete and bodily 
sense. Herder‟s notion  Besonnenheit indicates that thinking depends on the senses. 
This is exactly the overriding topic of Sculpture. Here Herder sets out to “transform 
his sight into touch, to make his seeing into a form of touching”, so that we come to 
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realize that “sight is but an abbreviated form of touch” (Herder, 2002, p. 41). As he 
makes clear in the quote about the nursery (see above), this slow and incomplete form 
of seeing is also more truthful than a disembodied type of sight (that of a vision that is 
disconnected from touch and thus from bodily experience) even though it remains 
stuck in features of human imperfection: namely incompletion and obscurity as the 
lack of a full or complete vision.  
Related to his attempt in Sculpture to combine the rational with the embodied, 
the semantic field of Herder‟s favorite notion Besonnenheit creates the stage for an 
immanent alterity where “oppositions cancel each other out” (Herder, 1991, p. 719) 
Herder‟s notion Besonnenheit is Spinozist rather than merely a translation of Locke‟s 
term “reflection”, because it depicts the workings of the mind as idea of the body: the 
corporal and the bodily lose their respective demarcations and as such they traverse 
back and forth between their respective centers of gravity. Herder‟s term 
“Besonnenheit” certainly refers to Locke‟s notion of reflection. Locke‟s term does 
not, however, incorporate a reference to the senses and the body as does Herder‟s 
Besonnenheit. Beiser sees Besonnenheit as merely a borrowing from Locke: 
“Borrowing a term from Locke, Herder sometimes calls reason „reflection‟ 
(Besonnenheit). He chooses this term to refer to man‟s characteristic self-
consciousness” (Beiser, 1987, p. 134). Like his notion of „touch‟ in his discussion of 
Sculpture, Herder‟s term Besonnenheit is not merely cerebral. Herein consists 
Besonnenheit’s Spinozist slant: it is a word that does not exclude the senses but rather 
incorporates them.  
  Already in his Journal of my Voyage in the Year 1769 Herder focuses on 
Spinoza‟s understanding of the mind as the idea of the body. As with Spinoza, Herder 
stresses the interdependence of reflection and action. Extending and developing 
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Spinoza‟s critique of a Cartesian mind body dualism (see Mack, 2010), Herder 
advances a philosophy of the senses. He does so not only by taking issue with the 
predominance of the cerebral (sight) over the corporeal (touch) but also by excoriating 
a hierarchy of sensual perception. The mind interacts with the body in a way similar 
in which the senses interact amongst themselves:  
 
 Moreover we have to make use of all our senses. The sense of touch, for example is 
dormant in our time, and the eye takes its place, though often only very inadequately. 
[…] In general there is no axiom more noteworthy, and almost more often forgotten, 
than this: without the body, our mind will not function; if the senses are crippled, the 
mind is crippled too; if the senses are used vigorously and in proper measure, the 
mind, too, is invigorated (Herder, 1969, p. 83).
iii
  
 
The parallelism of the expression “in action” or “in use” (im Gebrauch) gets lost in 
English translation. The mind cannot act without a body. Likewise corporal action 
(Gebrauch) invigorates cerebral activity. Herder thus emphasizes the interdependence 
of various bodily and mental performances (such as the interdependence of sight and 
touch). Without the sense of touch, human perception becomes impoverished. Here 
Herder implicitly introduces an historical aspect into Spinoza‟s critique of the 
mind/body dualism.  
How does history enter into this philosophical topic? Through his historical 
approach Herder naturalizes human creations: they are not eternal; instead they 
participate in a natural process of decay. This is Herder‟s genetic approach (an 
approach which J. G. Fichte transforms into his science of knowing.): it de-eternalizes 
human achievements and it removes contemporary preferences and predilections from 
the central position they might otherwise occupy in the formation of judgments on the 
aesthetic value and moral accomplishment of a given product or character. In this 
context Beiser rightly emphasizes the naturalising approach of Herder‟s historical or 
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genetic method: “To understand human creations, Herder argues, we must resist the 
temptation to see them as eternal or anatural. Rather, we must regard them as products 
of human history” (Beiser, 1987, p. 142).   
  Around the time at which Herder embarked on his journey of 1769, he started 
work on his treatise Sculpture. Here he also develops his genetic approach when he 
discusses how the antique sense of touch made room for the philosophical sense of 
sight within modernity. As with poetry, sculpture belongs to a past that cannot replace 
the present. Herder argues that our relationship to Greek sculpture should be one of 
friendship rather than one of idolatry. As moderns we must be wary of submitting to 
an idolatrous and thus mindless worship of the past which would destroy our 
distinctive particularity:  “We should treat them [i.e. Greek sculptures] as friends, not 
idols. Instead of subjugating ourselves to them, we should treat them, as the name 
suggests, as exemplars that present to us in bodily form the truth of ancient times, 
making us aware of the proximity and distance between their form of life and our 
own” (Herder, 2002, p. 61).  The study of what has been forgotten establishes both 
proximity and distance. The sense of touch as understood by the Greeks belongs to a 
distant age. In the excerpt quoted above, Herder appreciates the cognitive value of this 
neglected sense. He does not, however, advocate an imitation of its classical 
connotation. Neither does he plead for a repetition of Greek sculpture within 
modernity. Instead he modernizes our understanding of touch so that it incorporates—
rather opposes or excludes—the more modern rational sense of sight. 
The tactile sense has been marginalized due to the progression made by the 
non-tactile rational sciences (philosophy is a case in point). Herder, however, argues 
that the senses are not distinct from reason. Following Spinoza, he perceives of the 
mind as the idea of the body and this is why reason reasons about the senses. 
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Reflection is this form of reasoning: it is precisely what Herder‟s notion Besonnenheit 
denotes. As Howard Caygill has pointed out, Herder develops an all-inclusive notion 
of reflection, one that embraces the lowly faculty of touch: “In place of discrete 
faculties or capacities for thinking, willing, and language, Herder proposes a totality 
of human powers which structures itself through „reflection‟” (Caygill, p. 177). In 
order to present an accurate account of reflection, Herder has to attend to the 
intellectual powers of a haptic perception. From the inception of the age of 
philosophical inquiry onwards, which according to Herder is one-sidedly based on the 
sense of sight, the capacity of touch has been marginalized and almost completely 
forgotten. By retrieving this lost sense, Herder in fact revolutionizes the emerging 
„modern‟ discipline of aesthetics: “Instead of reducing aesthetics to taste (Geschmack) 
by legislating judgement, Herder emphasizes the productive discrimination of tasten.             
He points to an alignment of beauty, production, and autonomy in the production of 
proportion which synthesized a view of beauty as embodiment with a notion of 
culture as the self-cultivation of freedom through reflective judgement. With this 
position, the epoch of beauty and the police-state is theoretically superseded” 
(Caygill, p. 183). In this quote Caygill delineates the groundbreaking effect of 
Herder‟s fascination with an almost forgotten relic of the past: with the sense of touch 
which modern society has deemed insignificant. Caygill clearly shows how this 
transformation of aesthetics has important political ramification: by dissolving the 
divide between the cerebral and the corporal, Herder also undermines the hierarchical 
societal structure that has been advocated by German political theorists of the police 
state from Sanuel Pufendorf  (1632-94) to Christian Wolff (1679-1754).  
In this way the retrieval of the lost sense of touch has the capacity to 
revolutionize modern aesthetics as well as politics. Herder‟s historical imagination is 
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therefore not of antiquarian interest only. By dint of the historical imagination, the 
distant past can be rendered relevant for an accurate understanding of contemporary 
concerns. As long as this proximity does not destroy an awareness of the present the 
so conceived closeness of the past still remains distant. Herder establishes a fine 
balance between the ancients and the moderns as well as between the corporeal and 
the cerebral. He thus does not play off touch against eyesight. Rather, he argues for a 
combination of both senses (as well as for the non-exclusion of the moderns by the 
ancients and vice versa), which in turn would enhance rather diminish the life of the 
mind. Like Greek antiquity the sense of touch belongs to a pre-modern age that is 
analogous to the ontogenetic stage of childhood. A return to antiquity is thus a return 
to the nursery. The difference between child and adulthood might indicate the 
construction of a hierarchy in which one is inferior to the other. This is, however, not 
Herder‟s point. Rather he wants to bring about the anamnesis of that which has been 
forgotten and repressed (Inka Mülder-Bach, p.360). In a way similar to which the 
divergence between body and mind establishes their mutual interdependence, the 
present cannot properly function without being cognizant of the past.  
Herder neither devalues natural or historical data that constitute the empirical 
body of knowledge. In his Journal of my Voyage in the Year 1769, however, he 
dismisses as romantic any belief in the immediacy of the past:  
 
In every age—though in each in a different way—the human race has had happiness 
as its objective; we in our own times are misled if, like Rousseau, we extol ages which 
no longer, exist and never did exist, if we make ourselves miserable by painting 
romantic pictures of these ages to the disparagement of our own, instead of finding 
enjoyment in the present. Seek then even in biblical times only that religion and 
virtue, those examples, those forms of happiness, which are appropriate to us: become 
a preacher of virtue of your age! (Herder, 1969, p. 89) 
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Herder anticipates Nietzsche‟s critique of historicism in the essay “The Uses and 
Abuses of History” that is part of the book Untimely Observations (1873-76). 
Crucially, Herder advances this analysis while questioning Rousseau‟s one-sided 
depiction of the „noble savage‟. This assessment of premodern culture constructs a 
radical divide between past and present. While acknowledging the difference between 
the bygone and the contemporary, Herder attempts to save what has passed from 
being forgotten and dead. He does not advocate an uncritical study of history. Rather, 
he tries to focus on those elements which are relevant for problem solving in the 
present. In this way the study of history (Greek sculpture that privileges touch) always 
already requires the mediation of the present (the modern dominance of sight over 
touch). Contrary to the common perception of Herder as a romantic, he in fact clearly 
articulates that humanity cannot find enjoyment in an immediate manner. The senses 
depend on the reflection of the mind (sight or philosophy) in the same way as the 
reflection of the mind depends on the work of the senses (touch and embodiment). 
Sustainable enjoyment can only be attained through the interaction between these two 
disparate faculties.  
The study of both natural and human history thus enables survival of the 
senses within the here and now. In his Essay on the Origin of Language Herder 
dialectically affirms that the present incorporates the non-presence of the past. In the 
same way as it cannot immediately live in the sensory realm of the body alone, 
humanity equally cannot do without the reflection on its history, if it wants to survive 
within the present. Like Spinoza, Herder is concerned not with ideals but with the 
immanence and the physicality of the conatus. Here, however, life‟s ongoing self-
preservation (conatus) pertains not only to the materiality of nature but also to the 
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remnants of the human past (Greek Sculpture). The past represents a cynosure by 
which humanity can orient itself on its journey into the future.  
 
4 Thinking as Touching 
 
What is crucial here is that Herder not only attempts to excavate a rather neglected 
sense (touch) but that he argues that without this rather marginalized faculty we 
would be unable to mature intellectually. In a highly ironic and brilliant move Herder 
argues that without touch we would not be able to see. Herder reverses Denis 
Diderot‟s question (in his Letter on the Blind) “What can the blind perceive without 
the use of touch” by asking “What could the sighted perceive without the use of 
touch?” (Gaiger, p. 15).  His reply is quite clear: the sighted are blinder than the blind 
when they too much trust their eyes. The exclusive reliance on eyesight is not to be 
trusted, because our sense of sight depends on light. This becomes amply clear in the 
dark when we have to rely on touching things in order to orient ourselves. Sight, 
Herder argues, only provides us with the shadow or contours of things, whereas touch 
uncovers the obscure but solid truth of our embodied world.  
By interpreting light and sight not so much as agents of Enlightenment but, on 
the contrary, by associating the sunlight and what it enables, namely eyesight, with 
shadows of the truth, Herder implicitly reverses Plato‟s famous parable where the 
inhabitants of the cave are separated from the real sunlight by the walls of the cave 
and thus only see darkly shadows rather than the truth itself. Herder not only reverses 
Denis Diderot (as has been pointed out by Jason Gaiger in the quote above), and Plato 
but also the godfather of modern scientific reason, Descartes.   Qualifying Descartes‟s 
privileging of the mind over and above the body, Herder advances a novel account of 
humanity‟s uniqueness. Humanity distinguishes itself from other animals not only 
through its rational capacity but equally through a physiological one: that of touching 
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the embodied world with its hands (later on, namely in the Ideas, Herder defines 
humanity‟s uniqueness as not only based in its mental capacities but also in its 
physiology when he says that what is singular about humans is not its reasoning as 
such but its upright position). Countering the strong ideational tendencies in Plato and 
Descartes, Herder argues that we are only capable of conceiving ideas because we are 
capable of touching bodies with our hands:  
The light that strikes my eye can no more give me access to concepts such as solidity, 
hardness, softness, smoothness, form, shape, or volume than my mind can generate 
embodied, living concepts of independent thinking. Birds, horses, and fish do not 
possess these concepts. Only human beings have them, because alongside reason we 
possess a hand that can feel and grasp. If we did not have this, if we had no means by 
which we could confirm the existence of a body for ourselves through our own bodily 
feeling, we could only infer and guess and dream and fabricate, and we could know 
nothing for certain. (Herder, 2002, p. 36) 
 
 
The mind as self-enclosed entity is liable to fall prey to a world of dreams and 
fabrications that distort rather than grasp the world (this is of course the very subject 
matter of the pre-critical Kant‟s brilliant Dreams of a Ghost Seer of 1766—roughly 
the time during which Herder composed Sculpture). In order to form concepts by 
which we can orient ourselves in the world we need to traverse back and forth 
between the cerebral and the bodily. The certainty for which Cartesian rationalism 
strives can ironically only be attained by abandoning Descartes‟s mind-body divide. 
Sculpture is the genre which helps coordinate our cerebral capacities with the tangible 
sphere of touch and embodiment. According to Herder sculpture demands of us an 
endless journey from mind to body and vice versa.  
This mobility characterizes sculpture‟s modernity. Unlike a more pre-modern, 
exclusive reliance on touch, Herder‟s philosophy of touch does not diminish or 
belittle the importance of rational detachment. As we have seen, Herder advocates a 
fusion of both sight and touch. This interdependence of the senses—which his 
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analysis of sculpture illuminates—runs parallel to his dialogical approach toward 
historical and cultural diversity. The incomplete state of our capacities as well as their 
diversity requires a mobility that traverses fields of strengths which seem to be 
disconnected from each other. According to Herder, we—being constituted by diverse 
mental and bodily abilities—are, however, all interconnected in so far as we share one 
common creator—however different our conceptions  of this creator-God are (be it 
Muslim, Jew, Christian, Hindu etc.). By interconnecting sight and touch, medicine 
and the humanities as well as the ancient and the modern, sculpture outdoes various 
dualities and thus holds out the promise of not only a co-existence but, more 
importantly, a mutual preservation of what is diverse.  
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*
 This article is related to but separate from the discussion about the hidden Enlightenment of 
diversity as advanced in my forthcoming book Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity: the 
hidden Enlightenment of Diversity from Spinoza to Freud, (New York: Continuum, 2010).  
 
 25 
                                                                                                                                            
i
 I am grateful to Jonathan Israel for an illuminating conversation about Spinoza‟s fascination with 
Jesus‟s justitia and caritas. 
ii
 For a discussion of this point see Beiser, 1992, pp. 189-221. 
iii
  “Zweitens. Alle seine Sinne zu gebrauchen. Das Gefühl z E. schläft bei uns ein, und das Auge 
vertritt, obgleich manchmal nur sehr unrecht, seine Stelle.[...] Ueberhaupt ist kein Satz merkwürdiger 
und fast vergessener, als: ohne Körper ist unsere Seele im Gebrauch nichts: mit gelähmten Sinnen ist 
sie selbst gelähmt: mit muntern proportionierten Gebrauch aller Sinne ist sie selbst munter und 
lebendig ”(Herder, 1983, p. 143). 
